



Report - FINAL

Maryland Task Force
on Preventing & Countering
Domestic Terrorism

Summary Report & Recommendations

December 1, 2022

Version 1.0



State of
Maryland

 **Maryland**
DEPARTMENT OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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Promulgation

This publication is presented on behalf of the Task Force for Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism. The Task Force is chaired by Secretary Russell J. Strickland (Maryland Department of Emergency Management) and Deputy Director Mark Hubbard (Governor's Office of Homeland Security).

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Maryland Department of Emergency Management

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I. Mission Statement

The Report on the FY2023 State Operating Budget (SB 290) and the State Capital Budget (SB291) contains the following guidance regarding the Task

Force on Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism (DTTF), which serves as the mission statement for the task force:

“Task Force on Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism:

It is the intent of the General Assembly that the Maryland Department of Emergency Management (MDEM) shall hold regular meetings of the Task Force on Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism that was first convened in fall 2021 to determine how to effectively oppose domestic terrorism in Maryland including, but not limited to, countering online extremism while protecting First Amendment rights (D52 Joint Chairmen’s Report – Operating Budget, April 2022 41).

The membership of this task force shall continue to consist of representatives from the legislature with equal representation from both political parties, the Executive Branch, and other interested parties. The task force shall be asked to review domestic terrorism threats from all potential sources and offer suggestions and guidance to MDEM on such areas as the following: coordinating with federal, State, and local agencies; consulting with the academic community; working with public health professionals; seeking new grant opportunities for the State; identifying trends in domestic terrorism; and collecting and implementing best practices.

MDEM will deliver a summary report on the task force’s work and recommendations to the budget committees, the House Judiciary Committee, and the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee no later than December 1, 2022.”

This document serves as the summary report called for by the legislature.

II. Methodology

MDEM assembled the FY2022 DTTF based on agency participation in the 2021 task force meetings. Participation was expanded by invitation to ensure a full complement of relevant public safety and public service sector representatives. The DTTF convened four multi-sectoral meetings in accordance with the vision of the Maryland legislature. Participants included representatives from a State-level cross-section of legal, law enforcement, intelligence, K-12 school safety sectors, joined by those from institutions of higher education (IHE), health and human services agencies and departments, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and nonprofit service organizations.

All meetings were conducted in-person, with options for individuals to connect to the meeting virtually (online or by phone). The meetings were led by the Maryland Secretary of Emergency Management, Russell Strickland, and

the Deputy Director of the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, Mark Hubbard.

Meeting agendas directly reflected the guidance from the Maryland legislature, including focused discussions on online extremism, the role of IHE, trends in domestic terrorism, working with health and human services officials, identifying sources of funding, and collecting and implementing best practices. Deputy Director Hubbard assigned facilitators to lead discussions on each of these topical areas, as well as notetakers to capture key points from the discussions. The final meeting of the series included a discussion of the overall DTFF recommendations for the State of Maryland, as described within this report.

On November 21, 2022, for the purpose of soliciting additional input, an executive brief of the DTFF membership and associated activities was delivered to the Government Emergency Management Advisory Council (GEMAC).

A list of DTFF participants, meeting agendas, and copies of presentations are included in the Summary Report [appendices](#).

III. Task Force Recommendations and Findings

The overarching recommendations from the 2022 DTFF series of meetings include the following:

- 1. Invest in a permanent State of Maryland capability focused on violent extremism prevention to include not only domestic terrorism but also homegrown violent extremism associated with international terrorism, as well as hate crime.**

There are three primary reasons for this recommendation:

- a) The boundaries between international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and hate crime are not rigid. These threats overlap and the relationships between them change over time.
- b) The prevention activities suitable for one form of ideologically motivated violence are relevant in preventing others; therefore, framing the issue broadly as “violent extremism” allows the task force to meet the intent of the legislature to address domestic terrorism, while also optimizing public safety investments by simultaneously addressing other forms of ideologically motivated violence.

(i) Accordingly, to more accurately represent its purpose and scope, the **DTTF also recommends a name modification to Violent Extremism Prevention Task Force (VEPTF).**

- c) Hate crime is the most common form of ideologically motivated violence in the United States, and inflicts nearly identical physical, psychological, and social harms as terrorism upon victims and communities. Further, the overwhelming majority of hate crimes in the United States are motivated by the same biases that motivate domestic terrorism – namely white supremacy and male supremacy. In addition, increased awareness of hate bias incidents at houses of worship or targeted toward a victim’s religion further call for an expanded focus to include hate crime within the realm of this task force (State of Maryland, 2021 Hate Bias Report).

Focusing only on terrorism and not hate crime would therefore mean allocating risk reduction resources based only upon a very small percentage of the ideologically motivated violence occurring in the State. Instead, resource allocation decisions should be made based on a holistic threat assessment of violent extremism including hate crime, domestic terrorism, and international terrorism.

2. Establish a permanent coordinating office – equipped with financial and personnel resources, executive authority, and a chain of command – intended to facilitate a multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral task force to advance this mission.

There are three primary reasons for this recommendation:

- a) Preventing violent extremism requires participation across State-level agencies and departments, including those outside of the law enforcement and intelligence domains (e.g., K-12 and higher education, health and human services officials).
- b) Families, communities, and civil society institutions are often better placed to minimize risk factors to violent extremism, identify someone at risk of participating in violent extremism, and facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration following participation in violent extremism than explicitly law enforcement officials or agencies. Engaging and permanently including a variety of State-level entities can leverage this broader spectrum of potential non-criminal justice prevention initiatives without violating civil rights and civil liberties.
- c) There is a significant role for IHE to generate research to inform programs (including measurement and evaluation studies on the efficacy of programs), educate a broad range of learners on

changing situations and best practices, and deliver professional development training on violent extremism prevention as appropriate. Establishing a coordinating office with multi-sectoral intent would allow engagement and leverage of the State's substantial pre-existing capacities in this area as well.

3. Adopt an approach to violence prevention that includes primary prevention (e.g., raising awareness of violent extremism, increasing trust and lines of communication between communities and local government), secondary prevention (e.g., multidisciplinary interventions for at-risk individuals) and tertiary prevention (e.g., rehabilitation and reintegration).

There are three primary reasons for this recommendation:

- a) This approach builds on the strengths of individuals, families, and communities to crowd out vulnerabilities to violent extremism, among other harms. This approach therefore invites active participation and empowers a broader coalition of individuals who are better placed to reduce risk without violating civil rights and civil liberties than a solely criminal justice-focused approach.
- b) Because responses to this issue overlap with responses to other issues, this approach emphasizes the coordination of risk reduction activities as opposed to the creation of potentially redundant capabilities dedicated specifically to violent extremism.
- c) Research has demonstrated that purely criminal justice-focused approaches are insufficient as standalone strategies. While law enforcement and intelligence agencies do respond to immediate violent incidents, they also exist in a larger threat ecosystem – they play an essential role in disruption of mobilizing threats before an incident, and in recovery operations following an event.

Recognizing that violent extremism is a function of multiple facets of environment (e.g., socioeconomic situations, psychological conditions, political influences) and interacts with a variety of legal protections and civil rights (e.g., free speech, free association), it is critical to supplement law enforcement agencies' capabilities with those of other entities that can provide information and guidance in each of these many facets. A multi-sectoral, holistic approach is therefore not only advisable, but key to the initiative's success.

A. Specific Areas of Discussion and Recommendations

Beyond these overarching recommendations, the DTF engaged in focused discussions on the following topics as directed by the legislature. The following observations and recommendations are the result of those discussions.

Federal, State, and Local Agencies

Monitor the activities, guidance, and products of the Maryland Department of State Police, Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC), Maryland Active Assailant Interdisciplinary Work Group, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council, and others (e.g., associated, relevant workgroups, committees, agencies) to maintain the most current situational awareness and tools to improve Maryland's efforts toward violent extremism prevention. The DHS Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) office continues to develop a wealth of resources and community-based strategies to prevent acts of terrorism. As the CP3 expands, the DTF will review emerging educational, technical, and financial violence prevention initiatives.

Academic Community

IHE can and should play a significant role in the future Violent Extremism Prevention Task Force (VEPTF). Through great strides in areas like behavioral threat assessment and mental health provision on campuses across Maryland, IHE serve as model prevention and awareness programs, able to be scaled widely throughout the State in both the private and public sectors. IHE can additionally serve as capacity-building partners for the task force, which already includes representatives from the Center for Health and Homeland Security (CHHS) [*University of Maryland Baltimore*], the Mid-Atlantic-Center for Emergency Management & Public Safety (MACEM&PS) [*Frederick Community College*], and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) [*University of Maryland – College Park*].

The task force envisions a consortium of IHE that would:

- Serve as the hub for a Violent Extremism Prevention community of interest involving the public and private sectors, facilitating ongoing discussion, collaboration, and capacity building efforts, including pursuing grants and contracts to advance the task force mission through research and training.
- Cultivate a cohort of researchers and students interested in the subject matter.

- Leverage existing research, education, and professional training initiatives to advance State efforts, to include creating consistent training for professionals across agencies and departments to harmonize State efforts.

For example, task force participants were very interested in consistent training on behavioral threat assessment best practice.

- An example of the need for IHE to engage in training related to domestic terrorism prevention can be found in the U.S. Homeland Security Advisory Council Disinformation Best Practices and Safeguards Subcommittee Final Report of August 24, 2022. Recommendation #1 states: “It is imperative that DHS address inaccurate information that undermines its critical missions.” The spread of disinformation poses a threat to countering terrorism and the security of our nation and State. IHE can develop and promote statewide disinformation training.

Health and Human Services Professionals

Health and human services professionals, such as social workers and educators, can all contribute to strengthening protective factors against multiple harms (including but not limited to violent extremism at the individual, family, and community levels) without securitizing their professions.

Further, by adopting this approach at the task force level, it allows the task force to seamlessly fold in existing programs and to describe shared approaches, goals, and metrics with the same vocabulary.

For example, the 988 hotline, which helps Marylanders access mental health services, can serve as a starting point for in- or out-patient treatment as a secondary prevention option for individuals struggling with mental health concerns who might also be engaging with violent extremist networks online or in-person.

Seeking New Financial Supports for the State of Maryland

The task force identified multiple potential sources of funding, including from the federal government, the State government, and the private sector, including:

- **The Department of Homeland Security Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention grant program**

- **The Department of Homeland Security Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security Grant programs**, both of which in FY21 included a requirement for 7.5% of the total national allocation to address domestic violent extremism
- **The Department of Homeland Security Basic Ordering Agreement with START at the University of Maryland**
- **The Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance Grants program**, directed within Maryland by the Office of Crime Prevention, Youth, and Victim Services
- **The Department of Homeland Security Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships**, which offers educational, technical, and financial support to help community efforts in support of violence prevention initiatives
- **The Governor's Office of Crime Prevention, Youth, and Victim Services Protecting Against Hate Crime grant program**
- **Private sector organizations** can be approached to help strengthen communities in Maryland.
 - For example, Under Armour is already supporting the 2nd Lt. Richard Collins III Foundation to partner ROTC cadets at historically Black colleges and universities. Through this expanded effort, ROTC cadets from predominantly white institutions as well as historically Black colleges and universities will engage in weeklong team building treks, foster improved dialogue, and build trust and camaraderie between the future officers of our all-volunteer military from different racial backgrounds. This is an example of an innovative primary prevention program, honoring the memory of an African American man murdered by a white supremacist.

Identifying Trends in Domestic Terrorism

The task force included active participation from MCAC, including a brief on trends in domestic violent extremism nationally and in Maryland. MCAC fostered an important discussion on the importance of data collection on hate crime and hate incidents, as well as on terrorism. In addition to law enforcement data aggregated by MCAC, the task force discussed various unclassified datasets generated by START at the University of Maryland including the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS), and the Bias Incidents and Actors Study (BIAS), that are

considered authoritative nationally and should be leveraged for the purposes of the task force going forward.

In the United States, since the early 1980s, domestic terrorist attacks are occurring more frequently. Hate crime rates as reported to the FBI are the highest that they have been in over a decade. While the DTF's work was broadly focused on assessing and countering all forms of violent extremism regardless of origin or motivation, it is also important to note that all reputable data sources reviewed concur that white supremacist ideologies and biases are currently motivating the overwhelming majority of violent extremist incidents.

Implementing Best Practices

The DTF discussed the general “direction of travel” nationally as it relates to violent extremism prevention, which is reflected in the overarching recommendations above. Specifically, the task force recommends adopting a multi-sectoral task force model engaged in holistic approaches to violence prevention inclusive of hate crime and terrorism.

Going forward, the task force envisions leveraging research from a consortium of IHE to inform task force programs, and to measure and evaluate the performance of those programs. Further, this consortium can convene on a regular basis a public and private sector community of interest to foster dialogue and identify promising practices for adoption by the task force. Finally, this IHE consortium can generate training for public and private sector audiences and educational programming for students based on research. For example, task force participants were very interested in the idea of a multi-sectoral cohort of professionals from the community of interest taking a class together on behavioral threat assessment best practice to advance and harmonize violence prevention efforts in the State.

IV. References

Disinformation Best Practices and Safeguards Subcommittee Final Report. (August 24, 2022). U.S. Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council.

State of Maryland 2021 Hate Bias Report. (September 2021). Maryland Department of State Police and Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center.

V. Additional Resources

DHS Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships

<https://www.dhs.gov/CP3>

Domestic Violent Extremist Groups and the Recruitment of Veterans

[Extremism Report.pdf \(house.gov\)](#)

FBI Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism

<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-report.pdf/view>

The Importance of Peer Support in Preventing Domestic Violent Extremism

[Report on Peer Support in Preventing Domestic Violent Extremism \(house.gov\)](#)

VI. Appendices


Appendix I – *Task Force Membership*

- Maryland Department of Emergency Management
- Maryland Office of Attorney General
- Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Prevention, Youth, and Victim Services
- Maryland House of Delegates
- Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center
- Maryland State Police
- Maryland Office of the Public Defender
- Baltimore UASI at Baltimore Metropolitan Council
- Maryland Council on American-Islamic Relations
- Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism
- Anti-Defamation League
- University of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security
- Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
- Maryland Department of Health
- NAACP, Maryland State Conference
- Governor's Office of Homeland Security
- Mid-Atlantic Center for Emergency Management & Public Safety
- Maryland Center for School Safety
- Emergency Management Division, Frederick County, Maryland
- Baltimore Jewish Council
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- Maryland Department of Transportation
- Baltimore Police Department
- DHS Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships

Maryland Active Assailant Interdisciplinary Work Group

Focus Areas:

- Emergency people search and recovery guidance
- Field operations guidance
- Equipment standards and guidelines
- Prevention and early intervention resources
- Best practices and lessons learned from real-world incidents



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
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Active Assailant Interdisciplinary Work Group (AAIWG)



Appendix III – *The Domestic Violence Extremist Threat Environment in 2022*
[slideshow presentation]

[Presentation follows on next page; this page has been left blank to permit change to landscape orientation. Some formatting has been altered to permit content replication in Microsoft Word.]



MCAC

MARYLAND COORDINATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER

THE DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST THREAT ENVIRONMENT IN 2022

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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) is currently unaware of any credible or specific information indicating an imminent threat posed by any domestic violent extremist (DVE) actor(s) in the MCAC's area of responsibility (AOR).

MCAC'S CIVIL RIGHTS / CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY

Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) recognizes and safeguards the constitutionally protected rights of the people to peaceably assemble, speak, and petition the government.

- The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.
- MCAC's Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties policies ***prohibits collection or reporting*** of constitutionally-protected activities and events that ***do not involve extremist activities, threats, or acts of violence.***



DEFINITIONS

IDEOLOGICAL LABELS

2011

Anarchist
Animal Rights
Anti-Abortion
Black Supremacist
Environmental Rights
Homegrown
Lone Offender
Militia
Racist Skinhead
Sovereign Citizen
White Supremacist

2022

Anarchist
Animal Rights
Abortion-Related
Anti-Gov't/Anti-Authority
Environmental Rights
Homegrown
Lone Offender
Militia
Racially Motivated
Sovereign Citizen

DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST (DVE)

An individual *based* and operating primarily within the *United States* or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further *political or social goals*, wholly or in part, through *unlawful acts of force or violence*.

RACIALLY OR ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (RMVE)

Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in the potentially ***unlawful use or threat of force or violence*** with intent to intimidate or coerce, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from bias, often ***related to race or ethnicity***, held by the actor against others, including a given population or group.

ANTI-GOVERNMENT OR ANTI-AUTHORITY VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (AGAAVES)

Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in the potentially ***unlawful use or threat of force or violence*** with intent to intimidate or coerce, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from ***anti-government or anti-authority sentiment***, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies; or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy.

MILITIA VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (MVEs)

Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in ***acts of unlawful violence*** directed at ***federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure*** in response to their belief that the government is deliberately stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime.

- These individuals consequently ***oppose many federal and state authorities' laws and regulations, particularly those related to firearms ownership.***
- MVEs often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government.

ANARCHIST VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (AVES)

Individuals who seek, wholly or in part, through ***unlawful acts of force or violence***, to further their opposition to all forms of ***capitalism, corporate globalization, and governing institutions***, which they perceive as harmful to society.

SOVEREIGN CITIZEN VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (SCVEs)

Groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in *acts of unlawful violence* directed at *public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities* in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected.

- SCVEs believe that all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.

SELF-DESCRIBED “TARGETED INDIVIDUALS”

Self-described Targeted Individuals (TIs) are people who claim to be ***followed, surveilled, harassed, and otherwise victimized by unknown government forces*** as part of a coordinated effort to control their minds, as well as thousands of people around the globe.

- Some TIs have perpetrated high-profile violent attacks including the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting and the 2016 ambush shooting in Baton Rouge which killed four police officers.
- MCAC assess that TIs with violent ideations will likely continue to pose a threat to government and law enforcement officials, especially as conspiracy theories that TIs believe validate their beliefs proliferate.
- Proliferation of TI beliefs combined with the current propagation of mis-, dis-, and mal-information (MDM) could potentially influence new adherents and tip those with violent ideations to engage in doxing or **violence against government, law enforcement, the public and public service officials.**

SELF-DESCRIBED "TARGETED INDIVIDUALS"

Targeted Individual Diagram

RLighthouse.com
Rev 4.2, Oct 2019

Figure D-2.



Standard Nomination Form - by FBI, CIA, DHS or Govt Agency



DOJ - FBI



Placed on Watchlist as "Non-Investigative Subject" (NIS)

TargetedJustice.com



NSA hacks phones & electronics

DHS & FBI



Fusion Center



Gangstalking, House break-ins, Chemical Attacks, Poisoning



CIA Denver provides Funding & PsyOps



Family Relations Destroyed. Isolation.



CFR.org Council on Foreign Relations
Directs Program

Lockheed GPS Satellite Tracking



(3600 - 3750 MHz)



Schriever AFB, USAF



V2K Implants
Remote Neural Monitoring



Viricator Attacks (3920 - 3935 MHz)



Cell Tower Attacks (digital beam forming @ 2300 - 2900 MHz)



Block Legal Help



Block Medical Help (FirstNet.com AT&T)

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
BOOGALOO

A term used to reference a *violent uprising or impending civil war*. While *RMVEs* typically use the term to reference an *impending race war* or other conflict that will lead to the collapse of the “system,” including the US Government and society, *MVEs* use it to reference an impending *politically motivated civil war or uprising against the government* following perceived incursions on constitutional rights, including the Second Amendment, or other actions perceived as government overreach.



ABORTION-RELATED VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (ABRVEs)

Consists of groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in the potentially ***unlawful use or threat of force or violence*** or intent to intimidate or coerce, in furtherance of political and/or social ***agendas related to abortion.***



ANIMAL RIGHTS/ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (AREVES)

AREVEs are groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in the ***unlawful use or threat of force or violence*** to intimidate or coerce, in furtherance of political and social agendas by those seeking to end or mitigate ***perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals or perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.***

- AREVE activity is driven by ***unlawful opposition to oil and natural gas infrastructure development*** and expansion projects, particularly those near ecologically sensitive habitats or waterways.
- AREVE activity will likely continue by opposition to farming or selling food and clothing derived from animals.

INVOLUNTARY CELIBATE (INCEL) VIOLENT EXTREMISTS (DTA-IS)

Individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of ***unlawful violence*** with intent to intimidate or coerce, in support of their belief that society unjustly ***denies them the sexual or romantic attention*** to which they are entitled.

- The "incel," adherence is ***primarily an online community***.
- DTA-Is ***blame*** social and political movements, such as ***feminism***, for empowering others to deny them.
- Although most incels do not engage in violence, ***incel violent*** extremists represent a ***subset*** of incels who ***use force or violence***, sometimes called "***incel rebellion***," to further their goals.

ALL OTHER DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT ACTORS (DTAs)

This category encompasses threats involving the potentially ***unlawful use or threat of force or violence*** or intent to intimidate or coerce, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas which are ***not otherwise defined under one of the other domestic terrorism threat categories***.

- Such agendas could flow from, but are not limited to, a combination of ***personal grievances*** and/or beliefs with potential ***bias related to religion, gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation***.



WHAT'S NEW

ACCELERATIONISM

Accelerationism is the belief that specific forces—historically economic—should be accelerated to effect societal change.


- Some far-right groups have adopted a violent form of accelerationism.
- Supporters of accelerationism promote terrorism and other violent acts in order to hasten the downfall of a societal order they believe is complicit in white genocide.



BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS


William Luther Pierce's 1978 novel "*The Turner Diaries*," depicts a ***race war resulting*** in the removal of non-white minorities and the ***creation of a white nation***.

- In the book, the race war is instigated by an underground white supremacist terrorist network that ***overthrows the U.S. government through guerilla warfare and terrorism***.
- The group, known in the book as ***the Organization***, believes the U.S. government is dominated by Jews, African Americans, and other minorities who are trampling white rights.
- The Organization launches a ***guerilla war*** in order to reclaim the country and create a ***new Aryan world order***.




BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS – CON'T

- The novel has influenced *transnational acts of murder, robbery, and terrorism* by those seeking to replicate the societal shift described in the book.
- Most prominently, the book influenced **Oklahoma City bomber** Timothy McVeigh, whose April 1995 bombing of Oklahoma City's **Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building** mirrored a terrorist attack on the FBI headquarters in The Turner Diaries.
- In his book *Siege*, neo-Nazi James Mason also called for the creation of independent terror cells to create a new world order.



BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS – CON'T



CONSPIRACY THEORIES

Conspiracy theory refers to a complex **online community** disseminating information regarding multiple, related conspiracies in a web forum.


- The conspiracies often revolve around a belief that corrupt “**global elites,**” “**global cabals,**” and “**deep state**” actors are engaged in ongoing **plots** in an attempt to **seize global control.**
- A sizeable conspiracy theories are attributed to a persona known as “Q.”

CROSS SECTIONAL / INTERSECTIONAL

The spectrum of DVE ideologies have become more complex based on an influx of neo/new ideas.

- Blurring of ideological silos;
- Political violence more likely.

BLURRING OF IDEOLOGICAL SILOS




INDEPENDENT VIOLENT ACTORS (IVAs)


- IVAs present the ***most likely violent threat*** to targets in the State of Maryland;
- IVAs are defined by MCAC as ***individuals*** with ***no connection to existing criminal enterprise*** that engages in violent attacks;
- May or may not act in support of an extremist ideology;
- Does not receive direct instructions/orders/inspiration from an extremist group.

VIOLENT THREAT ACTOR TYPES


Directed Terrorist



Inspired Terrorist




Non-Ideological



BIG-T INFLUENCE MODEL

Grievance



Non-criminal indicators

Criminal indicators

MARYLAND IVA SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS

2017

- May – College Park (Stabbing, 1 dead)
- October – Edgewood (Shooting, 3 dead)


2018

- March – Great Mills (Shooting, 1 dead)
- June – Annapolis (Shooting, 5 dead)
- September – Aberdeen (Shooting, 3 dead)

2019

- May – National Harbor (Thwarted)

TACTICS AND TARGETING



MOST LIKELY VIOLENT THREAT TACTICS



Firearms and Edged Weapons

- Primarily handguns and semi-automatic rifles
- Easily accessible
- Minimal training/experience required



Vehicle Ramming

- Primarily passenger vehicles and small trucks
- Easily accessible
- Minimal training/experience required
- **Attackers frequently employ secondary weapons**



Improvised Explosive Devices


- US-based attackers favor simple devices
- Minimal chemistry/explosives training required
- Precursors less likely to set off law enforcement tripwires

OTHER TACTICS OF CONCERN



Arson

- Few examples of extremist-motivated arson incidents resulting in mass casualties
- Typically intended to destroy property
- Most US-based extremist arsons are motivated by domestic extremist issues



Chemical/Biological


- Difficult to develop/control/disperse
- Most US cases involve targeting of individuals or small groups (assassination weapon)



**Unmanned Aerial
Systems**

- Popular in Middle East, recent uptick in south & central America
- Most commonly used as a means of delivering an IED payload

TARGETS OF CONCERN



Workplace/School

- Most likely target for those motivated by a personal grievance
- Attackers typically have access to facility and knowledge of security procedures



**Assembly
Occupancies**

- Designed to be accessible
- Limited egress points
- Predictable timing of crowds
- Opportunity to target specific groups



**Transportation
Infrastructure**

- Designed for ease of access/egress
- Confined spaces
- Predictable timing of crowds

OTHER TARGETS OF CONCERN



Special Events

- Elevated media attention
- Opportunity to target specific groups
- “Unofficial” satellite events with less security are more vulnerable




Outdoor Venues

- Easily accessible on foot or by vehicle
- Minimal security presence
- Attackers are less likely to be detected during pre-operational surveillance

DVES IN MARYLAND



RECENT DVE ACTIVITY IN MARYLAND




2/15/2019

Montgomery County

Arrest of US Coast Guard Lieutenant for firearms and drug charges. Was likely planning an **anti-government extremist** motivated attack from his work computer. (Convicted)


RECENT DVE ACTIVITY IN MARYLAND



1/16/2020
Cecil/Caroline Counties
& Newark, DE

Arrest of three members of **"The Base"**, a racially motivated violent extremist group on firearms and immigration charges. One member was a Canadian Army combat engineer. (One has pled guilty)

RECENT DVE ACTIVITY IN MARYLAND




3/12/2020

Montgomery County

Fatal Officer-Involved Shooting of Duncan LEMP^{USPER}, a **Boogaloo anti-government violent extremist**. Shooting occurred during the execution of a search warrant as part of a firearms investigation.


RECENT DVE ACTIVITY IN MARYLAND



10/7/2020
Baltimore County


Search warrant executed on alleged **Boogaloo** adherent for felon in possession of firearm. Suspect pled guilty in March of 2021.

RECENT DVE ACTIVITY IN MARYLAND



Jan-August 2021
Multiple Counties

Arrest of multiple individuals including **Proud Boys** adherents in Maryland for the January 6th attack on the US Capitol. (Additional arrests anticipated)



CONCERNS

CONCLUSION

- Ideologies are largely the same, but individual actors adhering to multiple beliefs.
- White Racially Motivated Violent Extremists are evolving.



QUESTIONS

CONTACT INFORMATION


Kurosh Jahromi

Deputy Assistant Director | Anti-Terrorism Division

MCAC Watch

1-800-492-TIPS (8477)

MDWatch@mcac.Maryland.gov



MARYLAND
DEPARTMENT OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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Larry Hogan | Governor
Boyd K. Rutherford | Lt. Governor
Russell J. Strickland | Acting Secretary

Domestic Terrorism Task Force Meeting Materials

Hello!

The Domestic Terrorism Task Force is excited to see you all for our first meeting on August 23rd, 2022! In preparation for the first meeting, the Domestic Terrorism Task Force would like to provide you with some additional pre-meeting sources to read. These sources include reports from the White House, Department of Homeland Security, and the National Governors Association. These sources cover current domestic terrorism detection, prevention, and response strategies as well as the ideology behind domestic terrorist groups.

Sources:

1. <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-report-domestic-violent-extremism-internal-review>
2. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/15/fact-sheet-national-strategy-for-counterering-domestic-terrorism/>
3. <https://www.nga.org/center/publications/issue-brief-preventing-targeted-violence/>
4. <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/03/11/dhs-releases-report-internal-review-domestic-violent-extremism>

Reminder:
The first meeting will take place on August 23rd, 2022 from 10:00-11:30 A.M. at 101 Community Place, Crownsville, Maryland 21032.

Maryland Department of Emergency Management, 5401 Rue Saint Lo Drive, Reisterstown, MD 21136
(410) 517-3600 | Fax: (410) 517-3610 | Toll Free: 1 (877) 636-2872

Maryland Domestic Terrorism Task Force Meeting

Consulting With the Academic Community

Kathy Francis
Executive Director
Mid-Atlantic Center for Emergency Management & Public Safety at Frederick Community College

William Braniff
Director
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

09.16.2022 • 1:00 PM • Windsor Mill, MD 21244

MICEM
Mid-Atlantic Center for
Emergency Management
& Public Safety

START
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

Advancing the Overarching Vision

Higher Education Resilience Effort (HERE)

- Develop a consortium of researchers, educators, and students from Maryland colleges and universities
- Leverage extant research, education, and training initiatives to advance state efforts
- Serve as the hub for a DT prevention community of interest (COI) involving the public and private sectors

The consortium could issue a bold call to action to educate, leverage support, change minds, and develop a culture of prevention against extremism and domestic terrorism.

02

MICEM
Mid-Atlantic Center for
Emergency Management
& Public Safety

START
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM



Mid-Atlantic Center for
Emergency Management
& Public Safety



Collective Feedback From 8.23.22

- **Question 1:** What added capability could this consortium provide that would be most helpful for your agency?
 - Current threat identification model has a gap – requires a criminal predicate
 - Behavioral threat assessment training could help close the gap
 - Identification of “high-threat” events
 - Multidisciplinary, professional certification model with a pilot in the NCR
 - Develop a more comprehensive model for the tip line
- **Question 2:** Is there a logical agency point of contact who could participate in the consortium?
 - Yes, most could provide agency contract.
- **Question 3:** What other agency should participate in this consortium?
 - Broad, public and private sector participation
 - Maryland Center for School Safety
 - Maryland Chapter of IACLEA (International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Officers)
 - Maryland Chapter of NABITA (National Association for Behavioral Intervention and Threat Assessment)
 - Mid-Atlantic Chapter of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals
- **Question 4:** What would be the most important topical focus for research, education, and training?
 - Threat assessment training – include the actions to take upon threat identification
 - Develop best practices resource list to form policy within Fusion Centers
 - Connect with the Maryland Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council of Maryland (U.S. Attorney's Office)
 - Connect efforts of the MD Domestic Terrorism Task Force to the First Amendment
 - Develop an introductory presentation outlining the role of the MD DT for MD Legislature

03



Mid-Atlantic Center for
Emergency Management
& Public Safety



Opportunities

New State Grant Opportunities

Identify Known Sources

- DHS TVTP Grant Program – Provides \$20M in funding annually for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, nonprofits, and IHE to establish or enhance capabilities to prevent targeted violence and prevention (FY22 awards not announced yet, start date 10/1/22)
- State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)*
- Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program*
 - *FY21: both included a requirement for 7.5% (\$77M nationally) of total allocation to be used to address Domestic Violent Extremism

Potential New Sources

- National Governors Association Roadmap to Preventing Targeted Violence initiative: <https://www.nga.org/preventing-targeted-violence/>
- DHS Basic Ordering Agreement with START/UMD (sole source contract mechanism) can include subawards to other entities, but we would need to find a DHS (HQ or a DHS component) sponsor
- Private sector sponsorship of IHE/civil society-led violence prevention efforts

04



DVE Trends and Responses

Tracking Trends

Data Collection Options

- Leverage START GTD, PIRUS, and BIAS datasets
 - Insight regarding plots, incidents, and perpetrators of terrorism and hate crimes
- Create Maryland-specific violent extremism data collection effort (comprehensive effort)
- Subscribe to AI-enabled monitoring of online discourse
 - Insight regarding recruitment and mobilization narratives
 - Critical infrastructure threat monitoring

Data Integration Options

- Formalize partnership to analyze MCAC and other "govt" data with "academic" data above

Tracking Responses

- **Taking Hate Seriously:** White House Summit on Hate-Fueled Violence, Eradicate Hate Summit, DoD CEAWG, and NCTC/FBI/DHS report to Congress all reference *DT and Hate*
- **NGA: Governor's Roadmap to Preventing Targeted Violence:**
<https://www.nga.org/preventing-targeted-violence/>
 - Multiple states conducted pilots that we can learn from
- **Longitudinal Public Opinion Surveys**
 - Important to inform any programmatic decisions

05



Best Practices

Collecting and Implementing Best Practices

- **EXIT (Europe)** Focused efforts to interrupt racist or violent group affiliations and activities. Three objectives: (1) establish local networks to support the parents of young people who are embedded in racist or violent groups, (2) enable young people to disengage from these groups, and (3) develop and disseminate methodical knowledge to professionals working with youths associated with violence.
- **CDC Social Ecological Model:** Violence Prevention. The goal is to stop violence before it begins by understanding the factors that influence violence. CDC uses a four-level social-ecological model to better understand violence and the effect of potential prevention strategies: Individual, Relationship, Community, Society. [The Social-Ecological Model: A Framework for Prevention | Violence Prevention | Injury Center | CDC](#)
- **NGA Governor's Roadmap to Targeted Violence Prevention:** Roadmap includes "Action Items": and "Guiding Principles," discusses data collection, metrics, and feedback loops between them, and was informed by other states' pilot efforts.

06

Kathy Francis

Executive Director

Mid-Atlantic Center for Emergency
Management & Public Safety
Frederick Community College

MS, CEM, MDPEMP

Contact:

kfrancis@frederick.edu

240-629-7804

William Braniff

Director

National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START)

Professor of the Practice

University of Maryland

Contact:

braniff@umd.edu

301-405-4022



Mid-Atlantic Center for
Emergency Management
& Public Safety

Thank You!



Maryland Domestic Terrorism Task Force

Meeting
Tuesday, August 23, 2022



Larry Hogan | Governor

Boyd K. Rutherford | Lt. Governor

Russell J. Strickland | Acting Secretary

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Agenda

1. Review 2021 meeting activities
2. Review new 2022 activities
3. Coordination activities and pathways
4. The academic community role/activities
5. Assignments, next steps, next meeting date(s)



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Desired Outcomes

1. Satisfy the legislative intent. (Proposed in 2022-HB 898)
 - a. Establishing the Office of Domestic Terrorism Response within the Maryland Department of Emergency Management for the purpose of developing strategies and resources to prepare for, prevent, and recover from domestic terrorism activities; requiring the Office to coordinate with federal State, and local agencies, consult with the academic community, and work with public health professionals for certain purposes; and requiring by December 1 each year a report to the General Assembly on the activities of the Office.
2. Provide specific and measurable action items.
3. Identify necessary funding to accomplish the mission.



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Our task after the CY 2022 Legislative session

The task force is asked to address the following: (HB 898)

- Review domestic terrorism threats from all potential sources
- Offer suggestions and guidance to MDEM on such areas as the following:
 - **Coordinating with federal, State, and local agencies; (August 23 meeting)**
 - **Consulting with the academic community; (August 23 meeting)**
 - Working with public health professionals
 - Seeking new grant opportunities for the State;
 - Identifying trends in domestic terrorism; and
 - Collecting and implementing best practices



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Learning Resources (shared in read-ahead)

RAND report- <https://www.route-fifty.com/public-safety/2022/06/states-preventing-mass-shootings/368066/>

<https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-report-domestic-violent-extremism-internal-review>

<https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/03/11/dhs-releases-report-internal-review-domestic-violent-extremism>

<https://www.nga.org/center/publications/issue-brief-preventing-targeted-violence/>



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Report and updates-Coordination efforts

CISA: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

MCAC: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center

AAIWG: Active Assailant Interdisciplinary Work Group



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Higher Education Perspectives

University of Maryland START- Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism

Frederick Community College- The Mid-Atlantic Center for Emergency Management and Public Safety.



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Discussion/Next steps

Discussion:

Next meeting: September 16th, 2022 from 1:00-2:30. Invitations will be sent out prior to the next meeting.



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Task Force Meeting

Introduction:

- Need at least 2 meetings in the future

Review of 2021 Meetings:

- See slide about bill 898
- Recap from last year's meetings: Awareness of engaging with mental health and academic community to counter domestic terrorism
- The hearings last year did not show tangible products or efforts. We want these future meetings to be able to identify and produce tangible and measurable deliverables and products
- Need to look at and identify all sources of domestic terrorism
- Will have a report from AAIWG in future meetings

MCAC Presentation:

- Rules of engagement are different for domestic terrorist groups because of United States Constitution and how it applies to citizens
- Law enforcement agencies cannot create lists of groups and people unless they make threats or use violence
- FOIA and PIA requirements means that the MCAC must give reports out to the public if requested
- A lot of the terrorist organization names have changed, but they mostly have the same beliefs
- DVE's act individually, once violence is used the person or group is labeled
- Anarchist views are not illegal until force is used to promote the views
- STEVE's think that laws don't apply to them
- Target individuals feel they are being targeted by microwaves and such. Will target MCAC like buildings and request for any documents that the government has regarding them. These groups are susceptible to misinformation and disinformation
- Boogaloo are a mix of REMV and anti-government and believe civil war is coming. They think that the government is infringing on their rights and want to overthrow the government
- Abortion: violence for or against
- Animal rights and environmental extremists: advocate for animals or environmental rights by threatening and using violence towards infrastructure and farmers
- BIG-T (Acronym); B is behavioral health, I is ideology, G is grievance, and T is trigger
- Common attacks today come in the form of firearms, edged weapons, vehicle-ramming, IEDs, arson, chem./bio., and unmanned aerial systems
- Targets are workplace, home and school, assembly places, transportation infrastructure as well as special events and outdoor venues
- Duncan Lamp is a common name used for Boogaloo
- **Reflections:** many ways that business and faith organizations can work to create a reporting system that doesn't violate the rights of United States citizens. Behavioral threat assessment is a great way to prevent future attacks

- There is good communication between law enforcement and emergency management/department of transportation
- Public health and EMS is a huge part of MCAC and need to create a better information sharing system for communication of terrorist like behavior
- Prevention is a multi-disciplinary effort, not just law enforcement
- How can teachers and faith based organizations assist in this identification process?

Academic Community

- High threat liaison out of Arlington that helps communicate counter terrorism efforts
- ATAP and programs from START/MACEM&PS are great opportunities for first responders and public safety entities
- The discussion lead to identifying that the more agencies and entities that are involved in the identifying terroristic behavior, the more like the terrorist event will not happen
- Questionable behavior should be communicated to local coordination centers. The centers need to have a law enforcement line but also mental health contacts to help mitigate the issues or behaviors
- Thought: The 911 response system needs a behavioral response entity that can respond to incidents involving mental health

Closing Thoughts

- The group does great work but there needs to be a physical and more “showable” product.

Maryland Domestic Terrorism Task Force

Friday September 16th, 2022



Larry Hogan | Governor

Boyd K. Rutherford | Lt. Governor

Russell J. Strickland | Secretary

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Agenda

- Welcome/Introductions
- Reports and Updates
- Welcome new partner: UMD Center for Health and Homeland Security
- Continuing discussion from past meetings -Higher Education
- Maryland Active Assailant Interdisciplinary Work Group
- Discussion/Next Steps/Next Meeting Date and Times



Report and Updates-Coordination Efforts

- Group updates
- TVTP

Continued Discussion

- Role of higher education in ED/emerging initiatives
 - START- Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
 - Discussion
 - Frederick County Community College
 - Discussion

Public Health Professional Reports

- University of Maryland, Center for Health and Homeland Security
 - What we do/past efforts and projects
 - Comments
 - Discussion

Coordination Efforts

- AAIWG-Maryland Active Assailant Interdisciplinary Work Group
 - What we do/past efforts and projects
 - Comments
 - Discussion

Collective Planning Goals and Outcomes

- Discussion
- Recommendations
- Next steps/next meeting

Next Domestic Terrorism Task Force Meeting

- **When:** Thursday, October 13th, 2022- 10:00 A.M.-12:00P.M.
- **Where:** MCAC Training Room: 7125 Ambassador Road Suite 130 Windsor Mill, MD 21244
- **Objectives:**
 - Identify trends in domestic terrorism; and
 - Collecting and implementing best practices



The mission of the Maryland Department of Emergency Management is to proactively reduce disaster risks and reliably manage consequences through collaborative work with Maryland's communities and partners.

Mark Hubbard

mark.hubbard@maryland.org

443.952.0292



Appendix IX – DTF Task Force Meeting 2 Notes

2nd DTF Meeting Notes

Introduction:

- Noting notable

Report Updates:

- Noting notable, mentioned to meeting participants that they can invite anyone that they see fit

Continued Discussion:

- Trying to push for next meeting to be health-oriented
- Need to identify the capabilities and gaps in the current/available health measures (Mr. Strickland) Received the TVTP grant. More information will follow.(See TVTP facts sheet)
- More updates and in depth facts sheet will come out in the future

MD START:

- The vision to develop a community of interest
- Want to help Maryland with its prevention posture and extend to public and private entities
- Current threat identification model had a gap, but START can bring threat assessment needs together from their work
- Helped pullout agencies and bring them to the table including IACLEA
- What are the most important topics and focus points? Developing a set of best practices
- Funding: Many requirements of different funding sources require that 7.5% of funds to go to DVE prevention/protection/research
- Trends and ways to identify them: Leverage line: START, GTD, PIRUS and many other tools (Can be found on website)
- Hate crimes are underreported compared to actual terrorist attacks
- Tracking can allow for looking into different websites and other public information to gain visibility on terrorism trends or different terrorist incidents
- There is currently no reliable information on public opinion data on government response to terrorist incidents
- Building trust between the public and government is key for public buy-in on preventing terrorism
- Sara Barra comment: Would be helpful to tell how interventions are working, maybe develop a document or framework how other states are working to make data see-able. Discussion about metrics of terrorist events. Governors Road Map: Which is combination of a Set Statewide Vision, Multidisciplinary Approach and Stakeholder Identification and Buy-In (from NGA website)
- Need to focus data on hate-related data
- DOJ has pilot program to work with states data on hate crime, could be helpful when creating a deliverable/product
- MD STATE police: police have trouble actually calling a hate crime, a hate crime. Additionally, modern ways of policing limits contact between police and the public
- Hate-bias reports come out on October 1st, (every year) the numbers do not always come out constantly. Bigger jurisdictions are better at determining crime or bias. The MCAC applied for a grant that would help take care of some of yearly law enforcement training requirements (training focus) on terrorist-related information and how to report on it).
- There is a need for spending money on not only prevention and protection from terrorist events, but also a need for reintegrating terrorists and DVE's back into society after they are prosecuted.

Public Health: University of Maryland, Center for Health and Homeland Security

- What the group does:

- General background: Founded after 9/11 attacks
- Started with counter terrorism and terrorism-related research. They then branched into the emergency management and public health realm.
- Past 3 years have been focused on Covid-19-related efforts and are now focused on helping local government entities develop Covid-19 after action reports
- The group is also getting back to helping all stakeholders with past and pre-Covid activities
- They don't do intel and threat assessment side of terrorism
- Support with local EOCC activations
- Help with recovery process as well recovery plans
- Questions: Worked with Travis Nelson and got seed funding for acting/working with law enforcement public school counselors. Efforts were to try and stop student online chat room activities/engagements and stop hate crimes from happening by bridging the gap between the different members of the community
- Other public health efforts included working with the emergency management community. This included nursing home preparedness efforts
- Teach Law efforts: Help students learn law related to terrorism activities. Also note that they have a strong nexus to helping local police file hate crime charges 18 USCC 18 a and b **Mark, do you remember the exact US Codes?**
- Many plans relating to mass violence are out of date and need to be updated. Example: many companies do not include the component of telework in their emergency plans
- One of the biggest requests that was received was for help with companies' active shooter events.

Coordination Efforts: AAIWG- Active assailant Interdisciplinary Work Group

- Priority was working with fire and ems to develop plans and integration of all hands approach to active assailant events
- Helps gather all stakeholders at the state level and other locals from across the state for various prevention and response efforts
- Exercise: Texas school shooting. Malls and shopping centers do not have plans in place. It makes it hard for different efforts or emphasis one response.
- Mitigation is key to solving this issue but looking to move more into prevention efforts
- One of the major goals is to help provide planners with development efforts
- Mr. Strickland talked about the 5 bullet points on the slide 14

NEXT MEETING:

- October 13th from 10:00-12:00 at the MCAC
- No other notable comments

Maryland Domestic Terrorism Task Force

Thursday, October 13th, 2022
10:00 A.M.-12:00 P.M.



Larry Hogan | Governor

Boyd K. Rutherford | Lt. Governor

Russell J. Strickland | Secretary

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Agenda

- Past Meeting and Report Updates
- Grants and Programs: The Governor's Office of Crime Prevention, Youth, and Victim Services
- The Public Health Aspect of Domestic Terrorism
- Next steps:
 - Developing the report (due December 1)
 - Next meeting: Monday, October 31st, 2022 from 1:00 P.M.-3:00 P.M. MCAC-7125 Ambassador Road, Windsor Mill, Maryland 21244



Past Meeting and Report Updates

Higher education findings and contributions (Kathy Francis/ Bill Braniff)

AAIWG- MSP SGT Travis Nelson

New Jersey hearing

2021 Hate-Bias report-US Department of Justice

Deeper Dive-US Supreme Court- Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act; responsibility for (hateful) speech postings in digital/social media channels



Grants

Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Prevention, and Youth and Victim Services

Agency overview



Public Health

Sara Barra, Maryland Department of Health

“The report” (due December 1, 2022)

Structure of the report-format and style

Attachment of task force presentations

Key recommendations

Funding required

Structure of government (for Domestic Terror Prevention)

Activities anticipated



The mission of the Maryland Department of Emergency Management is to proactively reduce disaster risks and reliably manage consequences through collaborative work with Maryland's communities and partners.

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Appendix XI – DTF Task Force Meeting 3 Notes

Intro:

- R.S. Report out comments about the meeting. Domestic Terrorisms and squatting across Maryland are closely related
- A squatting bill was considered. ADL has been working on it and starting a taskforce for squatting
- Squatting with 911 centers. 911 board is in legislation and task force will pick it up

Meeting:

- Wants to end today with a strong understanding what the report should look like
- Strong speaking points for report
- Bill will help us write the report. Understand what the definition is and what it should look like
- AAWIG gives perfect picture of what working with different stakeholders should look like
- Summit tomorrow for 'left of bullets'
- Want TF members to share different outlets and sources of information on Domestic Terrorism
- 2021 Hate Bias report came out and can be a helpful perspective
- Case looks at section 230 of social media and if they should regulate Domestic Terrorism language and access to terrorism information (Gonzales v. Google)
- Section 230 could apply to different entities like games, documentaries and others

MD Crime Prevention, Youth, and Victim Services

- The office is responsible for implementing the governors crime prevention programs
- Stakeholder engagement is key to crime prevention
- Includes addressing Domestic Terrorism
- 2018 had 15,000 hate crimes reported and has grown over the years
- Governor has programs that includes upgrading tools and infrastructure
- Includes helping vulnerable communities, producing multiple documents in numerous languages
- Worked with FBI and other state entities to prevent crime
- Worked to dismantle numerous crime groups across the state
- BJA grant has been used to dismantle terrorist and crime groups while also building up communities
- Helped purchased items to support law enforcement and others involves in crime prevention
- Need to address problems across the entire spectrum. This is key to preventing crime and domestic terrorism across the state
- Bill B. Grade from the fed? BJA funds used for numerous different law enforcement entities to keep police motivated. Using the funds could help prevent crimes in the future and could be useful, due to the decline of future police applicants
- Bill B. talked about fidelity of hate crime data. Can we use the grant programs to develop a reporting system for hate crime?
- Best practices for identifying hate crimes: can the grant be used for training of Law Enforcement and other enforcement entities to help understand reporting?
- Police accountability and training grants work to ensure that police are taking training and de-escalation methods are being used
- Need to have the state apply for the money and not individual entities apply for portions of the grant BJAC
- Most important is that people have access to data, it is streamlined, and that all members know how to use it
- Do we know why the data is not accurate? High accountability with people to report the hate crimes. Criteria for hate crime is not known.

- Hate crime system needs to be streamlined and need to know how the hate crimes reporting process takes place
- MCAC: has a hate crime reporting system that can look at who was impacted from the incident. Look at if it impacted a certain community. Make the pipeline for other reporting
- Screening tools during reporting can be helpful for making more accurate reports
- EMS reporting tool is accurate and could be helpful
- Look at data mining options
- Disconnect between reporting issues from different jurisdictions

Sara Barra- Public Health

- Background in public health and emergency management
- Dept. of Health's goal is to improve the partnership between health and all other health related facilities
- DOH runs 11 health facilities helping multiple populations, 24 local health depts.,
- For this group: public funded behavioral outreach our services that support 200,000 residents,
- Work with judiciary reporting of extreme crimes regarding and affecting public health
- Opioid health operations center
- Facilities master plan, 20 year plan to help develop what the crisis response plan should look like, improve the overall health of members in the state
- Hotline 988, 211 press 1,
- 899 is national suicide prevention hotline, counselors and answer... free, confidential support, connecting to community mental health services, nationwide launch in July 2022
- 211 press 1 connect Maryland and caregivers to mental health services, [PressOne.211MD.org](https://www.pressone.211MD.org) is the website
- These programs above may help the groups work
- Get with Sara B. secretary and feed any recommendations from the sect. to the group
- Another way to think about public health and the TF is to think about extremist violence as a disease, how we stop that disease. Encourage health habits that discourage hate, reporting of events and possible threats, and then reintegration or rehab for the original issue
- DOH can tailor their approach to the issues to fit these guidelines-> Sara B in response: she agrees with the 3 approaches to managing public health
- State Police works with the DOH: State police didn't know that they would be in response to the pandemic. This means that a much stronger relationship is needed between state police and DOH and work to help in response. This can be tailored to mental health and domestic terrorism
- Reflag Laws: What is the level of action taken when hints of domestic terrorism are found?
- Issues with getting report that we need and the data that is needed for reporting
- Bill B-> Sara B. teachers and public health members are hesitant to step in and curb domestic terrorism. Sara needs something in writing that she can take to leadership and have the conversation of getting involved with curbing Domestic terrorism

Report:

- Rehash and retrace steps with completing the report
- Want everyone's input and website to be put into the report. Need permission
- Central coordination which means that the specific entities need to monitor and help this effort
- All 6 of the meeting objectives get put into the notes and final report
- Hardest will be health and higher education. Need the most work and help in the report.

- Suggestion: taskforce will require executive oversight, clear delineation of efforts and list the positives of each person working in the group
- Develop hierarchy and see who can do what and who can't
- See how different entities would work together and how funding sources can work together
- Coordinate with subordinates or work with another group or existing entities
- Need a statute that provides staffing to the taskforce, so the work doesn't fall on a small group of people and they get overwhelmed
- Center for school safety had a lot more work added to the group which caused the group to become overwhelmed
- Need to make sure that the taskforce does not recreate something or repeat a process
- Need a coordination of search for funding sources
- Bill B. This is not just a government and school domain but it requires buy in from multiple different sources
- Need to have many different member added to the community
- Evolve communities and families Mark H
- Scott Boggs: challenges with beginning cross functional groups together. The group needs teeth. Great at finding purpose
- S.B.: Need to get the group to a point where they can live with the outcomes of the group. Working with members that want to be there and don't "have" to be there
- S.B. Has reach out to people across the county for violence prevention.
- Any group within COG NCR who have faced the same issues? Groups that are cross-function and cross-disciplinary. These groups can be standing or not standing.
- Next meeting will have an outline as to what the report will look like and contain
- Bill B.: Legalization what's the groups to respond to the internet and online activities. A lot of federal input
- Public school students on public school devices can be a possible inlet or outlet for bad information
- State can take its effort to stop certain online info outlets
- Travis N. will send initial governing documents of AAIWG
- This report and group cannot favor one side or the other. Report should be on all 3 sources of terrorism. Mention the boundaries of the report are fuzzy and unknown
- Email thoughts is any come up