



JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

December 6, 2010

The Honorable Thomas V. Miller, Jr., President of the Senate Maryland General Assembly, H107 State House Annapolis, MD 21401

The Honorable Michael E. Busch, Speaker of the House Maryland General Assembly, H101 State House Annapolis, MD 21401

The Honorable Donald DeVore, Secretary Department of Juvenile Services, One Center Plaza, 120 West Fayette Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201

Rosemary King Johnston, Executive Director Governor's Office for Children, Office of the Governor 301 W. Preston Street, Suite 1502 Baltimore, MD 21201

Members of the State Advisory Board on Juvenile Services c/o Department of Juvenile Services, One Center Plaza, 120 West Fayette Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201

Dear Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Sec. DeVore, Ms. Johnston, and State Advisory Board Members:

Enclosed please find a Special Report of the Juvenile Justice Monitoring Unit at the Office of the Attorney General. This report pertains to an escape on September 7 at the Charles H. Hickey, Jr., School. The Department of Juvenile Services (DJS) Response is also included.

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have about this report. I can be reached by email at nmoroney@oag.state.md.us and by phone at 410-576-6599 (o) or 410-952-1986 (c). All reports of the Juvenile Justice Monitoring Unit are also available on our website at www.oag.state.md.us/iimu.

I look forward to continuing to work with you to enhance services and programs provided to the youth of Maryland.

Respectfully submitted.

Nick Moroney Nick Moroney **Acting Director** Juvenile Justice Monitoring Unit

Cc: The Honorable James Brochin, Maryland State Senate

The Honorable Brian Frosh, Maryland State Senate

The Honorable Nancy Jacobs, Maryland State Senate

The Honorable Nancy King, Maryland State Senate

The Honorable C. Anthony Muse, Maryland State Senate

The Honorable Robert A. Zirkin, Maryland State Senate

The Honorable Kathleen Dumais, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Adelaide Eckardt, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Ana Sol Gutierrez, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Susan Lee, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Gerron Levi, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Anthony J. O'Donnell, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Victor Ramirez, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Luiz R.S. Simmons, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Nancy Stocksdale, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Joseph Vallario, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Jeff Waldstreicher, Maryland House of Delegates

The Honorable Nancy Kopp, Treasurer's Office

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Sheri Meisel, Karl Pothier, and Wendy Estano, DJS



STATE OF MARYLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT

SPECIAL REPORT CHARLES H. HICKEY JR. SCHOOL NOVEMBER 2010

Facility: Charles H. Hickey Jr. School

2400 Cub Hill Road Baltimore, Md. 21234

Superintendent: Mark Hamlett

Reported by: Jamaal Stafford and Tanya Suggs

Subject: Escape on September 7, 2010

Persons Interviewed: Facility Administrators, Direct Care Staff, Dining Hall Employees,

Youths, World of Work Program Administrators and Supervisor

Date of Report: November 2010

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Special Report focuses on the escape that occurred at Charles H. Hickey Jr. School (Hickey) in Baltimore, MD on September 7, 2010. Hickey is a secure detention facility owned and operated by the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services (DJS/the Department). The facility serves male youths between ages 12 and 18 and can house up to 72 youths. The facility's grounds are expansive and the physical plant includes four residential cottages: Mandela Hall, Roosevelt Hall, Clinton Hall and Ford Hall.

The escape on September 7 involved two youth who commandeered a Hickey food truck and drove through a barbed-wire security fence. This report includes an examination of the circumstances leading up to the escape.

The investigation revealed that youth were frequently left without direct care staff supervision when they assisted dining hall employees with post-dinner clean up chores. Also, dining hall employees frequently transported youth from the dining hall to residential units in an unsecured food truck – again without direct care staff supervision.

One of the youths who escaped on September 7 had been flagged on DJS records as an AWOL risk less than 3 weeks before the escape. The second escapee had previously AWOLed from community detention on three separate occasions before his escape from Hickey. The September 7 escape is the second escape from Hickey this year.¹

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 7, 2010, two youths escaped from Hickey after commandeering a food truck. For purposes of this Report, the two youths will be referred to as youth A and youth B. Youth A is 15 years old and Youth B is 17 years old. Both youths were assigned to the Roosevelt Hall residential cottage at Hickey. On the day of the escape, direct care staff, as well as dininghall employees, believed that youths A and B were enrolled in the World of Work Program.² These youths, however, were not in the program.

To participate in the World of Work Program, youths have to meet strict academic and behavior-related requirements. Youths in the program also have to sign a *Memorandum of Understanding* acknowledging that they understand all conditions and requirements of the Program.³ Youth who fail to meet requirements can be suspended or terminated from the program.

On September 7, at approximately 4:30 p.m., sixteen Roosevelt Hall youth and three DJS direct care staff (also called Resident Advisers or RAs) entered the dining hall. As the Roosevelt Hall youths finished their dinner, a dining hall employee asked an RA to assign two youths to

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¹ There was a third escape this year involving a youth who absconded en route to Hickey from a hospital visit.

² The stated mission of the World of Work Program is to assist youth in realizing their "working potential in a supervised environment" as youth perform "routine maintenance, painting, floor stripping/waxing, and general cleaning [of] the facility." Youth working in the World of Work Program - according to Hickey's Facility Operating Procedure (FOP) - are required to be supervised by a World of Work Student Supervisor at all times. Specifically, the FOP provided that all youth participating in the program should be "supervised at all times by the Student Supervisor and ... not work independently."

³ See Charles H. Hickey Jr. School World of Work Program, Memorandum of Understanding.

help with cleaning up. The RA selected youth A and youth B to assist the dining hall employees, believing they were a part of the World of Work Program.

At approximately 5:10 p.m., direct care staff left the two youths with a cook and a dietary line server. The remaining youths, along with the direct care staff, went to the nearby gymnasium. After clean up was finished at around 5:45 p.m., the cook transported youth A and youth B to Roosevelt Hall in a food truck. The youths sat next to the cook as passengers on a long bench seat. As the food truck approached Roosevelt Hall, Youth B began to punch the cook in the face repeatedly. The cook stopped the food truck. He tried to grab the keys before jumping out of the vehicle, but was unsuccessful. Youth A jumped out of the passenger side door, entered the driver's side of the food truck, and drove away with Youth B.

The cook did not have a radio or any other means to alert Hickey administration of the take-over of the truck, so he ran to a van post to notify security. Staff at the van post then notified other Hickey staff by radio that the two youths had taken the food truck. The youths careened at high speed across the Hickey grounds and drove the food truck through the security fence. Security personnel at the Gatehouse heard a crash and saw the truck leaving the facility, "doing at least forty-five to fifty miles an hour," with part of the security fence attached to the front of the vehicle.4

⁴ DJS Office of the Inspector General Report 10-84979 (October 2010).

A Hickey employee drove off after the food truck. The truck struck his vehicle and he sustained minor injuries. The youths drove through the surrounding residential community causing property damage to four vehicles and several mailboxes. They then abandoned the truck and continued to flee on foot.

Youths A and B were apprehended by law enforcement around 6:13 p.m. on the same day. Youth A was transferred to another juvenile facility and will be charged as a juvenile. Youth B was transferred to an adult facility and will be charged as an adult.

FINDINGS

DJS Direct Care Staff Should Have Maintained Sight and Sound Supervision of Youth. Direct Care Staff Violated DJS Policy by Leaving Youths with Dining Hall Employees.

Direct care staff provide the first line of security at all DJS facilities. Duties include escorting youth to locations around the facility and supervising them in housing units, classrooms and at recreation. They are responsible for the safety of youth and other professional staff members that enter the facility. These staff members receive intensive and ongoing training in safety and security techniques. Direct care staff are accountable for the youth under their supervision at all times.

Staff involved here should not have left the two youths who subsequently escaped alone with dining hall employees. Maryland Standard for Juvenile Detention Facilities 5.1.2.2.04 provides that "direct care staff shall regulate all youth movement from one location to another, including individual and group movement to and from all activities and programs according to written policies and procedures." By leaving these two youths alone with dining hall employees, direct care staff failed to regulate the movement of these two youths.

II. Direct Care Staff Were Not Informed About Which Youths Were In the World Of Work Program.

On the day of the escape, no youths were assigned to the World of Work Program. Youths A and B had been prohibited from participating in the World of Work Program before the escape. However, lack of appropriate internal communication at Hickey resulted in direct care staff mistakenly believing the two youths were still in the World of Work Program.

The World of Work administrators informed the World of Work Student Supervisor about the status of youths A and B, but did not inform the direct care staff. Following the escape, World of Work administrators amended their operating procedures to require that the status of youth in the program be disseminated to a variety of staff throughout Hickey.

III. Youths Should Never Be Transported in an Unsecured Vehicle.

Youth should never be transported in an unsecured vehicle. Youth A had been deemed an AWOL risk by DJS because of an AWOL from a residential placement facility. Youth B had AWOL'd from community detention on three separate occasions before the escape at Hickey. It is hard to understand why these two youths were transported in a vehicle that did not have a barrier between the driver and the youths, why the cook who was driving the truck had no back-up from direct care staff, and why the youths were not placed in handcuffs.

Maryland Standard for Juvenile Detention Facilities 5.1.2.2.05 provides that "guidelines for transporting youth shall emphasize security and safety." The lack of security and supervision while these two youths were being transported created an opportunity for them to commandeer the food truck and escape the facility.

Before the escape, it was common for youth to be transported in the food truck at Hickey. According to nearly every staff person interviewed, lone dining hall employees frequently drove youths back to their units in the food truck if no direct care staff was available to walk the youths back to their units.

IV. Roosevelt Hall's Logbook Failed to Outline Clearly the Location and Number of Youths Assigned to the Unit.

Some of the deficiencies discovered in Roosevelt Hall's Logbook on the day of the escape include:

- 1) Failure to document the number of youths present every 30 minutes;
- 2) Discrepancies regarding the number and location of youth between 2.00 pm and 6.00 pm: and
- 3) Failure to note the return of youth and staff to the unit.

Keeping track of both the number and location of youths assigned to the unit is critical. In this instance, proper documentation in the logs might have alerted supervisors to the fact that Youths A and B were left in the dining hall without direct care supervision. Proper documentation also serves to reconstruct security failures for future reference and training.

V. DJS's Office of the Inspector General (DJS-OIG) Report.

Immediately following the escape, the DJS-OIG began an investigation and concluded that Hickey staff did not violate any DJS policy. The investigation found "insufficient evidence to either prove or disprove an act of misconduct on the part of Staff regarding the students being able to escape from CHHJS[Hickey]."

The DJS-OIG Report did not address the DJS policy cited above which mandates that youth must always be supervised by DJS direct care staffers.

The DJS-OIG Report includes a recommendation that administrators at Hickey "[d]evelop training guidelines to ensure that youth are appropriately transported in a transport vehicle." However, the DJS-OIG report did not stipulate that youth should be transported only with direct care staff supervision and in secure vehicles with a barrier between the youth and the driver.

The DJS-OIG Report does not address the failure to properly document the Roosevelt Hall Logbook. Logbook entries are essential to security. They contain counts, locations and any restrictions on youth or concerns of staff.

CONCLUSION

When direct care staff left two youths alone with dining hall employees, a chain of events was set in motion that created an opportunity for escape.

Hickey administrators should ensure direct care staff supervision of all youth at all times. They should strengthen policies to assure properly supervised transportation of youth inside the Hickey security fence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. All DJS direct care staff, as well as facility administrators, should be retrained on the importance of ensuring that youth are supervised by direct care staff at all times.
- 2. Youths should only be transported in secure vehicles.
- 3. All DJS employees must have radios and should have distress alarms.
- 4. Direct care staff at Hickey should be retrained in accurately documenting counts of youth in unit logbooks every 30 minutes.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

General

Maryland Standards for Juvenile Detention Facilities 1.6 Policy and Procedure Manuals: Policies and procedures for operating and maintaining each detention facility shall be specified in a manual that is accessible to all employees. All employees shall be trained and shall be familiar with all policies that affect their work. This manual shall be reviewed annually and updated as needed.

Maryland Standards for Juvenile Detention Facilities 3.3.4 Legal History: The Admissions Officer shall perform a search of the ASSIST database to obtain all previously known information on the youth.

Security

Maryland Standards for Juvenile Detention Facilities 5.1.2 Secure settings

- **5.1.2.1 Living arrangements**: With primary consideration given to safety and security, normal living arrangement should be established and conform, as near as possible, to those conditions provided in non-secure facilities.
- **5.1.2.2 Security**: Security refers to the provision of staff and resident safety and to the prevention of escape from the facility. Security shall also include measures to prevent persons from entering the facility or grounds illegally. Means to ensure security shall consist of physical features of the building and grounds, policy and procedures, and staffing arrangements.
- **5.1.2.2.01**: An official daily movement roster listing the names of youth and identification numbers of assigned youth, along with housing locations, youth received and youth releases/transferred shall be developed and maintained. There shall be documentation to demonstrate room assignments.
- **5.1.2.2.02**: Direct care staff shall maintain a permanent log and prepare shift reports that record routine information, emergency situations, and unusual incidents. Entries shall be noted by date, time and initialed by staff.
- **5.1.2.2.04**: Direct care staff shall regulate all youth movement from one location to another, including individual and group movement to and from all activities and programs according to written policies and procedures.

5.1.2.2.05: Guidelines for transporting youth shall emphasize security and safety and shall be made available to all personnel involved in transporting youth.

Staffing

Maryland Standards for Juvenile Detention Facilities 5.1.3 Staffing: Staffing arrangements shall aim to provide a safe, humane, and caring environment. Youth to staff ratios developed by the Department shall ensure adequate supervision of youth. The allocation, deployment and assignment of resources/personnel to each facility shall be based on: 1. the budgeted population operating capacity; 2. the level of risk and needs of the population; 3. facility programs and services; and 4. physical plant architecture. Staff to youth ratios shall not be generalized, but rather based on facility design and age, activity and program level and other related factors.

5.1.3.1 Staffing Plan: Each facility shall develop a staffing plan consistent with policy and procedures governing staff ratio to youth which shall be reviewed and reassessed annually consistent with changes in population, facilities, activities and services.

Youth Movement

DJS Youth Movement and Counts, Policy Number RF-02-06, (Effective January 17, 2006):

<u>Policy</u>. Department of Juvenile Services (DJS) employees shall take youth counts to ensure the safety and security of youth, employees and the public to ensure accountability of youth at all times. Accountability and control of youth movement shall be a primary and critical security function. Each facility shall ensure the security of a facility by conducting counts of the population and by implementing procedures to regulate and control youth movement within the facility and during authorized movement outside the facility. Designated employees shall maintain awareness of the whereabouts of all youth assigned to the facility and provide documentation.

<u>Definitions</u>. Official Count means a physical count of youth conducted by security staff at a designated time. All movement of youth is stopped during an official count. Official counts are of the entire facility and are reported to the security office (or designated location) for comparison to the master count.

Procedures.

(1) Each Facility Administrator will ensure that an official count of all youth in residence occurs daily at 2:00 AM. This count must be called into Headquarters by 8:00 AM daily.

- (2) Each Facility Administrator will ensure that a physical count is taken, at minimum, every 30 minutes. At the direction of the Facility Administrator, a physical count may be taken more often than every 30 minutes based on need, size of facility or other circumstances as articulated in the FOP.
- (3) The Resident Advisor shall conduct counts every 30 minutes and call the count into the Command Control Center/Master Control/Tour Office. The count must be logged into the unit logbook within 15 minutes of the count.

Control of Youth Movement.

(1) Youth will not be allowed to move freely without the direct supervision of a designated facility employee.

Records and Documentation.

- (1) All employees shall read and initial the logbook, noting the count at the start of each shift.
- (2) All counts will be recorded in the unit logbook and called into the Command Control Center/Master Control/Tour Office.
- (3) Counts recorded in the logbook shall include:
 - (i) Time of the count;
 - (ii) The count itself;
 - (iii) Name(s) of employees performing count;
 - (iv) Location of groups of youth (library, class, outside area); and
 - (v) Youth outside of the location where the count is occurring.

<u>Charles H. Hickey Jr. School Facility Operating Procedure - Effective 3-25-10</u>

- Informal counts shall be conducted at least every 30 minutes and after any movement of youth from one area to another. Informal counts will be recorded in the unit logbook.
- 2) Resident Advisors Shall:
 - a. Conduct a physical head count prior to movement and transmit the movement along with the number of youth and staff to the Shift Commander, Master Control, and the Gatehouse for authorization.
 - b. Document in the logbook whenever a youth has been taken from one location to another.
- 3) **Monitoring**: The Assistant Facility Administrator will have primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with this operating procedure.

<u>Charles H. Hickey Jr. School Facility Operating Procedure: Procedure for Escape</u> or Attempt to Escape Prevention Response Plan - Effective 7-22-09

Purpose: To provide a systematic response to an attempt to escape or a successful escape from the Charles H. Hickey Jr. School. The Charles H. Hickey Jr. School Escape or Attempt to Escape Prevention Response Plan will ensure swift action by staff and that all required notifications will be made in a timely manner.

Procedures: The Department maintains a position of zero tolerance for attempted escapes or escapes. Appropriate levels of supervision, staff vigilance, staff postings, and proper building maintenance are all important considerations in preventing escapes. It is critical that staff know the exact number and location of all youth whom they are assigned to supervise at all times. Staff must be alert to escape risk, not become complacent, and monitor youth(s) for actions which could potentially lead to an attempted escape or a successful escape, at all times.

Responding to an attempted escape: 1) Assistant Superintendents and Superintendent must be notified within five minutes of the attempted escape. State police must be notified within five minutes.

Master Control:

- 1) Master control will immediately notify the primary law enforcement agency and inform them that a youth is missing and provide them with pertinent information. And activate community alert.
- 2) Within five minutes of an escape you are to notify the superintendent and assistants.
- 3) The Superintendent will contact the Assistant Secretary of the Department and the Office of the Inspector General and activate City Watch.

World of Work Program at Charles H. Hickey Jr. School

The following is the required criteria for all CHHJS (Charles H. Hickey Jr. School) students participating in the World of Work Program:

- I. All participants must hold a certificate of completion for a Maryland Standard High School Diploma or Maryland GED. All other participants must be approved by the Facility administrator.
- II. All participants must meet the terms of the CHHJS Behavior Management System and comply with the unit norms for satisfactory behavior.
- III. All participants must meet with Ms. Slechter, Ms. Hanges, and Mr. Burke to determine guidelines for employment, wage information, timesheet procedures and type/area of employment.
- IV. Weekly reviews will be held in the Employment Coordinator's Office in order to determine compliance, eligibility, and address issues or concerns related to the student's employment.

- V. A Student Evaluation Form will be maintained in the Employment Coordinator's Office to ensure weekly meetings and follow-up.
- VI. Strict adherence to these procedures must be maintained in order to qualify for participation in this program. Termination from or a three (3) day suspension will result when the World of Work guidelines are not met. Termination or suspension will be determined after meeting with the Employment Coordinator, Student Supervisor. A final ruling will be given by the Facility Administrator.



December 3, 2010

DJS Response

On September 7, 2010, two Baltimore County youth detained at the Charles H. Hickey, Jr. School overpowered a staff member to commandeer his vehicle which they used to break through the fencing at the facility. The youth were seen by posted direct care staff, who maintained a direct line of sight of the youth as the staff immediately pursued them. The staff made immediate contacts to additional DJS staff and law enforcement. These actions resulted in the youth being back in custody in less than half an hour.

The Department promptly notified the community by activating its Community Alert System, which notifies the Hickey community by telephone and email. The Hickey Superintendent and other senior DJS officials also canvassed the neighborhood to personally inform and offer assurances to residents. Three mailboxes were damaged by the youth, all of which were replaced and installed the following day by Hickey staff. Lastly, DJS issued a press release the next morning to inform the public at-large of the incident explaining that the Department's internal investigative officials had commenced a full investigation.

All of the findings about policy violations and the recommendations that were identified in the investigative report issued by the Department's Office of the Inspector General have been resolved through intensive re-training, policy enhancements, and stronger oversight, including:

- Re-trained all staff on policies and procedures for youth supervision and log book documentation; these policies and procedures are also required to be emphasized in all shift briefings, unit meetings, and formal training sessions.
- Strengthened methods of daily communication to inform all staff throughout the facility of youth approved for participation in the "World of Work" program. The program is continuing to operate with ongoing communication to all staff identifying participating youth. The World of Work program has operated without incident and to the benefit of youth at Hickey for three years. Youth approved for participation learn marketable skills in a variety of areas including carpentry, electrical repair, construction and painting.

- Reduced the number of exit points from the facility by installing additional security barriers.
- Increased the number of security posts on the grounds which are fixed locations staffed 24/7 by Resident Advisors trained in youth supervision.
- Installed additional razor wire on the facility's perimeter fence.
- Debriefed with all staffed involved and addressed their actions that contributed to the incident.